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Regional growth and finance in Europe: 
Is there a quality effect of bank efficiency? 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 13/2009 
Iftekhar Hasan – Michael Koetter – Michael Wedow 




In this study, we test whether regional growth in 11 European countries depends 
on financial development and suggest the use of cost- and profit-efficiency 
estimates as quality measures for financial institutions. Contrary to the usual 
quantitative proxies for financial development, the quality of financial institutions 
is measured in this study as the relative ability of banks to intermediate funds. An 
improvement in bank efficiency spurs five times more regional growth than does 
an identical increase in credit. More credit provided by efficient banks exerts an 
independent growth effect in addition to the direct quantity and quality channel 
effects. 
 
Keywords: bank performance, regional growth, bank efficiency, Europe 
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Selittääkö pankkien tehokkuudella mitattu 
rahoitusjärjestelmän laatu alueellisia kasvueroja 
Euroopassa? 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 13/2009 
Iftekhar Hasan – Michael Koetter – Michael Wedow 




Tässä työssä tutkitaan empiirisesti rahoitusjärjestelmän kehittyneisyyden vaiku-
tusta eri alueiden taloudelliseen kasvuun 11 maassa Euroopassa. Tutkimuksen ky-
symyksenasettelu korostaa rahoitusjärjestelmän laadun merkitystä talouskasvun 
kannalta ja puoltaa kustannustehokkuuteen ja voittoihin perustuvaa menettelyä 
mitattaessa rahoituslaitosten laatutasoa. Tavanmukaisista rahoitusjärjestelmän ke-
hittyneisyyden kvantitatiivisista mittaustavoista poiketen rahoituslaitosten laatua 
mitataan tässä työssä pankkien suhteellisella tehokkuudella rahoituksen välityk-
sessä. Tulosten mukaan pankkien tehokkuuden parantuminen kiihdyttää talous-
kasvua viisi kertaa voimakkaammin kuin vastaava luottojen määrän kasvu. Te-
hokkaiden pankkien luotonannolla on luottojen määrästä ja rahoitusjärjestelmän 
laadusta riippumaton lisävaikutus talouskasvuun. 
 
Avainsanat: pankkien suorituskyky, alueellinen kasvu, pankkien tehokkuus, 
Eurooppa 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, O16, O47, O52  
5 
Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... 3 
Tiivistelmä (abstract in Finnish) .............................................................................. 4 
 
1 Introduction  ......................................................................................................  7 
 
2 Methodology  .....................................................................................................  8 
 2.1  Regional  growth  ........................................................................................  8 
 2.2  Banking  quality  ........................................................................................  10 
  2.3  Data and regional allocation .................................................................... 12 
 
3 Results  .............................................................................................................  15 
 
4 Robustness  ......................................................................................................  17 
  4.1  Ordinary least squares ............................................................................. 17 
 4.2  Regional  allocation  and financial centers ................................................ 18 
 4.3  Alternative  and  additional growth determinants ..................................... 20 
 
5 Conclusion  .......................................................................................................  22 
 












Information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers tend to be lower in 
better developed financial systems because a better selection of productive 
investment projects, improved monitoring of borrowing, and a reduction in the 
amount of resources banks waste in the intermediation process (Pagano, 1993; 
Bertocco, 2007) facilitates growth and the accumulation of capital and growth. 
Many studies analyze this finance-growth nexus empirically and explain cross-
country growth differentials by the volume of funds relative to economic output 
(Levine, 2005). This study addresses two concerns regarding this literature. 
  First, inference drawn from comprehensive cross-country studies covering 
very different economies possibly suffers from excessive sample heterogeneity.
1 
Moreover, cross-country studies treat regions as ‘isolated islands’ (Quah, 1996) 
and usually neglect regional interdependencies. This can bias results, and studies 
such as Higgins et al (2006) therefore analyze economic growth and convergence 
at the regional level. However, few studies also assess the regional effects of the 
financial sector on economic growth.
2 
  The second concern relates to the measurement of financial development in 
most studies in terms of (relative) credit volumes. A mere expansion of credit 
need not indicate a qualitative improvement of intermediaries’ abilities to channel 
scarce funds from savers to borrowers, which is of crucial importance (Romero-
Ávila, 2007). We suggest a more direct measure of the quality of financial 
institutions, thereby addressing the issue of suboptimal empirical proxies for 
theoretical counterparts raised by Levine (2005). 
  We test whether better bank efficiency, estimated at the firm level, 
significantly spurs growth. This relative measure of bank performance gauges the 
quality of financial institutions relative to their peers instead of the quantity of 
funds intermediated. 
  We seek to contribute to the few regional studies on financial development in 
two respects.
3 First, we present evidence of a positive relation between banking 
quality and economic growth in several regions within 11 countries of the 
                                                 
1 Rousseau and Wachtel (2007) carefully point out that finance-growth nexus results are 
considerably weaker when assessing only industrialized countries, for example, and more recent 
periods. This does not necessarily imply the absence of a relation but merely that the inference 
requires careful sampling. 
2 Exceptions, such as Guiso et al (2004), provide indirect evidence given the focus on business 
establishment rather than growth but underpin the importance of regional differences. 
3 See, for example, Lucchetti et al (2001), Valverde et al (2003), and Hasan et al (2009) on the 
relation between bank market competition, efficiency, legal and political indicators, and growth in 
Italian, Spanish and Chinese regions, respectively. In an extension of these studies, we suggest 
here a more explicit measure of bank’s intermediation quality.  
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European Union.
4 Thus, we maintain a regional focus but cover a comprehensive 
sample of regions in an increasingly integrating financial system. To assess 
financial institutions, we employ bank-level data obtained from the Bankscope 
database and associate each bank with a specific European region. 
  Second, we hypothesize that the economic efficiency of banks converts scarce 
resources into financial products and services that produce growth. More 
specifically, Humphrey and Pulley (1997) point out that cost efficiency does not 
capture a bank’s ability to convert inputs efficiently into outputs, because the 
measure focuses only on the cost aspects of banking businesses. Instead, they 
emphasize the skills needed to maximize profits for a given production plan by 
estimating profit efficiency. This study is, to our knowledge, therefore the first to 
analyze the relation between regional growth in Europe and banks’ abilities to 
provide financial services and products efficiently from cost and profit 
perspectives. 
  The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce 
the empirical approach to test if higher regional bank efficiency fosters economic 
growth, and we describe the data. We discuss results in Sections 3 and 4 and 




2.1 Regional  growth 
Different regions of Europe have significantly different growth patterns Quah 
(1996). Likewise, banks’ ability to intermediate funds efficiently remains not only 
heterogeneous across the continent but regionally despite an ongoing 
harmonization of financial regulation in Europe (Bos and Kool, 2006). Given the 
importance of regional differences, we hypothesize that higher regional bank 
efficiency should promote regional growth, too. We specify a reduced-form 
growth model as a dynamic panel model (Levine et al, 2000) 
 
t , r
r t , s t , c 4 t , r 3 t , r 2 t , r 1 1 t , r t , r WX ln Z ln X ln FQ ln FV ln Y ln Y ln
ε +
μ + γ + β + β + β + β + α = −  (2.1) 
 
                                                 
4 We avoid excessive heterogeneity and exclude recent members of the EU that still have 
significantly different financial systems. Results for a sample of 23 EU countries are available 
upon request.  
9 
where Y is the gross domestic product per worker, X is a vector of regional 
controls,
5 t are time indicators, and r indexes European regions at Eurostat’s 
‘NUTS 2 level’.
6 To eliminate μr, an unobserved region-specific effect, we use the 
system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
  It is well known that financial development, especially volume-based 
measures, are prone to endogeneity problems because improving real economic 
conditions can trigger, for instance, an expansion in both credit demand and 
supply. Therefore, we follow Levine et al (2000) and employ lagged levels and 
differences as instruments for FV and FQ, respectively, to deal with this possible 
statistical endogeneity. In addition, we include control variables Zc to control for 
banking system traits per country c, which we use in the microestimation of bank 
efficiency described in this section (Lozano-Vivas et al, 2002). Financial 
development is measured in two ways: by volume (FV) and by the quality of 
financial development (FQ). The former resembles a specification well known in 
the finace-growth literature: bank credit volume relative to GDP. Due to inherent 
aggregation problems for financial volumes at the regional level, we specify a 
measure based on national market capitalization that is used in most finance-
growth studies. 
  A related challenge concerns the spatial allocation of both the volume and the 
quality of financial-development proxies. Ideally, we would weigh each bank's 
lending by local customer portfolios or the spatial distribution of branch networks. 
Unfortunately, neither is publicly available for European banks. We deal with this 
problem therefore primarily in a statistical way. Specifically, we also specify a 
spatial-lag model such that FV (FQ) of the neighboring regions can spill over to 
region r. Spatial lags are specified in X and account for the possibility that growth 
in region r depends systematically on financial development in neighboring 
regions s  ∈  R, where R is the set of all regions (Anselin, 1988). We use a 
predetermined contiguity matrix W to weigh FV (or FQ) of all neighboring 
regions.
7 In matrix notation, WXst is the weighted average of financial-
development proxies across Rr regions neighboring region r. The parameter γ 
measures whether regional growth benefits (γ > 0),  suffers  (γ < 0),  or  is 
independent (γ = 0) from the financial development of neighbors. 
  We have no theoretical precedent as to the spatial effects of financial 
development on regional growth. On one hand, better banking might enhance a 
region’s growth by facilitating real economic interaction. On the other hand, 
                                                 
5 Regional controls are the growth rate of the working population and spatial lags of FV and FQ. 
Adequate regional controls for human capital were not available, but we specify patents per capita. 
We also include a direct and a squared time trend to control for time-specific effects. 
6 NUTS: Nomenclature des unites territoriales statistiques. Descriptive statistics are provided in 
Section 3. 
7 We used binary Queen contiguity as a weighting matrix to average financial development for all 
regions that either have a direct border with region r or have vertices.  
10 
superior financial services in neighboring regions may attract investors and 
therefore have a ‘pull’ effect of investment and growth. 




2.2 Banking  quality 
To assess the quality of financial intermediation more directly, we measure a 
bank’s  relative efficiency in coverting inputs into a production set while 
maximizing profits. This relative measure is conceptually less prone to reverse 
causality criticism. Banks’ ability to demand inputs at given prices in optimal 
proportions should influence growth positively independent of whether the 
economy is expanding or contracting. A region in which banks fulfill their 
project-selection and loan-monitoring functions is on average more efficient than 
other regions and should benefit in terms of growth because the ‘right’ projects 
receive funding at the ‘right’ cost of lending given risk. 
  We assume that banks demand labor, fixed assets, and borrowed funds at 
given factor prices w to produce customer loans y1 and other earning assets y2 
subject to a technology constraint, which also depends on bank-specific and 
environmental controls z, and a pricing opportunity set such that total costs C are 
minimized and profits before tax PBT are maximized (Humphrey and Pulley, 
1997).
8 In the alternative profit model, we assume that banks possess some 
regional market power subject to a pricing opportunity set H(p,y,w,z), where p 
denotes output prices. This model assumes that banks have some local market 
power. Therefore, both minimum cost c*(y,w,z) and maximum profits π*(y,w,z) 
depend on input prices, equity, and output quantities. A translog stochastic 










j i it x ln x ln
2
1




Where LHS is either cost or profit and x is short for y, w, and z, respectively. In 
addition to bank production data, we also specify a time trend t to account for 
technical change. We assume εit =vit – uit for the profit frontier and εit = vit + uit for 
the cost frontier, where vit is i.i.d. and vi ~ N(0,
2
v σ ). To identify the inefficiency 
component uit, we re-parameterize λ = σu/σv. 
  Two issues are important to note in the efficiency estimation. First, despite 
ongoing integration, financial systems continue to differ across European 
                                                 
8 In line with the intermediation approach, we include interest expenses in total cost and specify 
the price of borrowed funds accordingly as a factor price.  
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economies. For instance, the Italian government began to privatize banks on a 
large scale during the 1990s, yet government-owned savings banks continue to 
constitute a sizeable portion of the German banking industry. Lozano-Vivas et al 
(2002) showed that failure to account for such systematic differences leads to 
contaminated inefficiency scores. Therefore, we specify country-specific controls 
in addition to banks’ equity capital to capture regulatory, macroeconomic, and 
banking-market differences in z.
9 These factors can influence optimal costs and/or 
profits as well as management’s abilities to attain the optimal frontier, we specify 
z in the kernel of equation (2.2) and as a determinant of the inefficiency 
distribution. The latter we assume to be  ()
2
u i , dz N ~ u σ + μ , where μ is the location 
parameter of the inefficiency distribution and d a vector of parameters to estimate. 
Any remaining unobserved heterogeneity across European banks is captured by 
bank-specific fixed effects αi. A bank i can deviate from optimal profits PBT or 
optimal costs C due to random noise vit or inefficiency uit. Equation (2.2) is 
estimated with maximum likelihood methods as a fixed-effect panel frontier 
(Greene, 2005).
10 Contrary to most frontier models, inefficiency is time-variant 
without imposing a monotonous trend. 
  Second, the use of the translog specification implies that we need to deal with 
banks incurring losses in the profit frontier, because the log of negative numbers 
is not defined. Most studies either dismiss observations with negative profits or 
inflate profits of all considered banks by adding the sample minimum plus one. 
However, Bos and Koetter (2009) suggest an alternative negative indicator 
approach, which is less likely to be biased. We set the dependent variable PBT for 
observations with negative profits to 1 but specify an additional indicator variable 
that takes the absolute value of losses if profits are zero or negative (before taking 
logs). It equals 1 for observations with positive profits. Thereby, we sample both 
profitable and loss-producing banks but explicitly include the latter information. 
Point estimates of efficiency are obtained as the conditional expectation of u given 
ε. For example, profit efficiency (PE) of 80% implies that the bank could have 
generated 20% more profit had it employed inputs and outputs efficiently. 
 
 
                                                 
9 We describe this data below in more detail. In an earlier version of this paper, we included 
country dummies instead. 
10 We follow the conventions in the frontier literature regarding distributional assumptions and 
restrictions to identify the model (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Note, however, that the 
properties of the alternative profit frontier are theoretically not as well defined as in the standard 
profit frontier case. But Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 213) write that ‘[..] it is reasonable to 
assume that [the alternative profit function] is non-decreasing in the elements of y and non-
increasing in the elements of w’. Therefore, imposing homogeneity of degree one on input prices 
for both cost and alternative profit frontiers seems reasonable.  
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2.3  Data and regional allocation 
We use unconsolidated financial data for approximately 7,000 banks in 11 EU 
countries between 1996 and 2004. The banks are mapped to 147 NUTS 2 regions 
based on three regional identifiers provided in the Bankscope database: country, 
city, and zip codes. 
 
Table 2.1  Descriptive statistics per country on growth and 
     financial  development 
 
Country  GDP growth 
Profit 
efficiency  Cost efficiency  Credit to GDP  N 
   Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD    
Austria  3.88  1.15  61.20  7.93  63.58  4.08  101.8  88.3  77 
Belgium  3.57  1.12  54.96  17.02  68.20  11.20  102.4  165.1  52 
Denmark  3.84  n/a  67.57  n/a  68.32  n/a  101.3  n/a  9 
Finland  4.26  2.18  73.22  13.28  66.01  14.07  74.9  63.2  15 
France  3.07  1.93  64.92  10.79  70.67  5.69  67.5  70.8  208 
Germany  3.44  1.63  62.51  5.65  68.44  6.63  115.4  182.3  369 
Ireland  5.18  1.23  46.17  0.00  54.36  0.00  156.8  0.0  8 
Italy  1.80  1.68  63.36  7.25  70.33  5.21  85.8  72.5  183 
Luxembourg  4.00  n/a  56.18  n/a  65.93  n/a  1433.4  n/a  9 
Spain  3.02  1.80  68.22  10.18  73.29  4.76  160.0  228.0  150 
Sweden  3.26  1.80  62.56  8.24  73.21  5.32  44.2  71.2  43 
Total  3.11  1.67  63.44  8.40  69.49  6.02  113.6  135.7  1,123 
Notes: All variables are denoted in percentages. GDP: Gross domestic product. SD indicates 
intracountry standard deviation across regions. N indicates observations. All variables averaged 
between 1996 and 2004. 
 
 
German districts (Regierungsbezirke) correspond to NUTS 2 regions, and we 
match banks’ postcodes to NUTS 2 regions using the so-called Regionalschlüssel. 
It enciphers German regions via a 12-digit code, and Regierungsbezirke are 
identified by the third digit. French NUTS 2 regions correspond to the 26 
departements, which nest several postcodes available per bank in Bankscope. The 
first two digits of the French postcode identify the NUTS 2 region. Italian banks 
are also allocated to NUTS codes via their postcodes. Here, a range of postcodes 
corresponds to a NUTS code. NUTS 2 regions in Spain coincide with the 19 
Spanish autonomic regions, which nest 50 provinces. The first two letters of the 
postcode identify the province and consequently the NUTS region of each bank. 
NUTS 2 regions in Austria match with the nine states (Bundesländer), which can 
be uniquely identified from zip codes. 
  All banks that could not be mapped via their zip codes are mapped manually. 
In this second step we use the city names provided in Bankscope to allocate banks  
13 
to NUTS 2 regions.
11 Denmark and Luxembourg comprise only one NUTS 2 
region, which renders the allocation of banks to NUTS 2 regions 
straightforward.
12 
  We aggregate point estimates of profit (and cost) efficiency to serve as our 
proxy for the regional quality of financial intermediaries FQ.
13 Likewise, 
aggregate lending per region across banks relative to GDP serves as a volume 
proxy FV. The final dataset is an unbalanced panel comprising 147 different 
NUTS 2 regions in 11 EU countries. Descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 highlight 
that even across old EU member states productivity growth differed at times 
considerably between 1996 and 2004. Likewise, the depth of financial systems 
also differs considerably across nations.
14 The dispersion of relative 
intermediation abilities is, however, much lower. 
  The comparison of efficiency levels across different samples, specifications, 
and methods is subject to caution because the former are relative measures. 
Therefore, efficiency levels depend crucially on how the benchmark is obtained 
(Bauer et al, 1998). Note nonetheless that alternative profit efficiency is relatively 
high compared to cross-country or US evidence reviewed in, for example, Berger 
and Humphrey (1997). Our use of a panel frontier estimator that accounts for 
bank-specific fixed effects might explain this. The latter might otherwise be 
identified as inefficiency. The few studies that also use this estimator to estimate 
PE among European banks find similar results.
15 Mean cost efficiency of almost 
70% is slightly lower than the mean indication of 75% to 80% mentioned in 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) but may simply reflect the more recent time period 
considered here. In sum, both cost and profit efficiency estimates are in line with 
previous evidence. Note that the intracountry standard deviation of growth and 
finance proxies is high and supports our focus on regions rather than nations. 
  To avoid efficiency measures that are contaminated when fitting one 
European frontier, we follow the suggestion of Lozano-Vivas et al (2002) and 
control for a number of country-specific traits in each of the respective banking 
systems. We show mean indicators per country in Table 2.2. To measure the 
regulatory framework, we specify the central banking independence index (CBI) 
suggested in Arnone et al (2007). This is a composite index of political and 
economic dimensions of central bank autonomy. Higher values indicate more 
                                                 
11 We exclude overseas and offshore territories. 
12 Irish bank data is only available for one region. 
13 The complete Bankscope sample includes unconsolidated financial accounts for 27,248 bank-
year observations in 25 EU countries in 1994–2004. We also tested alternative aggregation 
measures such as median or higher moments per region without material changes to our main 
results. 
14 For example, Luxembourg is a financial center. We control for such extreme observations. 
15 For example, Koetter (2006) reports mean PE of 64.7% for a sample of German banks, which 
are by far most numerous in the European banking market. In addition, we follow Lozano-Vivas et 
al (2002) and specify environmental controls in the kernel, which further reduces unobserved 
heterogeneity otherwise identified as inefficiency.  
14 
autonomy, which is positively related to financial stability and should therefore 
spur economic growth. We also include the Index of Economic Freedom from the 
Heritage Foundation (HER), which measures the propensity of a country’s 
policies to provide economic freedom. It is a composite index of ten indicators 
that rank policies in the areas of trade, government finances, government 
interventions, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and 
finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and informal market 
activity. Higher values indicate more economic freedom.
16 Although our sample is 
fairly homogenous, we note that both CBI and HER differ at times considerably, 
thus indicating the importance of specifying environmental controls in the 
efficiency estimation in order to avoid misidentification of such an effect in the 
growth regression. 
 
Table 2.2  Country-specific controls included in frontier 
     estimation 
 
Country  Controls  N 
   CBI  HER  DD  IB  DB  BC  BD   
Austria  0.94  66.85  2.49  2.86  46.33  0.56  0.05  77 
Belgium  0.94  65.58  10.02  1.07  24.80  1.31  0.44  52 
Denmark  0.75  69.30  18.37  24.85  373.96  0.40  0.05  9 
Finland  0.94  68.27  0.18  3.37  49.24  0.24  0.00  15 
France  0.94  59.18  1.90  2.71  39.83  0.44  0.05  208 
Germany  0.88  67.92  6.14  2.60  56.15  0.48  0.11  369 
Ireland  0.81  77.49  2.09  9.33  156.81  0.25  0.01  8 
Italy  0.81  61.86  1.78  2.21  19.22  0.49  0.09  183 
Luxembourg  0.94  76.12  81.03  467.11  14,000  0.04  0.01  9 
Spain  0.88  65.38  1.25  0.90  16.20  0.95  0.08  150 
Sweden  0.94  68.03  2.75  39.05  595.83  0.23  0.00  43 
Total  0.89  64.95  4.38  7.63  175.62  0.56  0.10  1,123 
Notes: CBI: central bank independence indicator (Arnone et al, 2007). HER: Heritage 
Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. DD: deposit density measured; IB: net income per 
branch; DB: deposits per branch; BC: branches per capita; BD: branch density (Lozano-Vivas et 
al, 2002, OECD 2008, World Development Indicators CD-ROM). All variables are averaged 
over 1996 to 2004. All monetary aggregates in thousands of deflated 2000 Euros.  
 
 
To control for further environmental factors and banking industry traits per 
country, we closely follow Lozano-Vivas et al (2002) and construct five measures 
from the bank profitability data of the OECD (2008). We consider the value of 
aggregate deposits per inhabitant (deposit density, DD), the income per branch 
                                                 
16 In addition, we included income per capita levels as well as population density in the frontier 
estimation to control for further effects influencing the supply and demand of financial services 
(Lozano-Vivas et al, 2002).  
15 
(IB), aggregate deposits per branch (DB), branches per capita (BC), and branches 




Parameter estimates for the regional growth model in equation (2.1) are shown in 
Table 3.1. Because the volume of funds may not be independent of economic 
growth, we specify financial-development proxies as predetermined and 
endogenous variables, respectively, and use lagged levels and differences as 
instruments. 
  The individual volume effect is insignificant. This is in line with studies 
reporting that the exclusion of less developed countries or the consideration of 
more recent years yields no or weak evidence of a finance growth nexus 
(Rousseau and Wachtel, 2009). Quantity effects alone may be insufficient to spark 
growth in mature economies in recent years. 
 
Table 3.1  Financial development effects on regional growth 
 
    Quantity  Profit efficiency  Cost efficiency 
     Quality  Both  Interaction  Quality  Both  Interaction 
Constant  1.117***  1.679***  1.061***  1.006***  1.715***  1.047***  0.954*** 
   [0.358]  [0.490]  [0.345]  [0.319]  [0.477]  [0.318]  [0.273] 
GDPt-1  0.876***  0.826***  0.886***  0.893***  0.825***  0.890***  0.899*** 
   [0.033]  [0.046]  [0.032]  [0.029]  [0.044]  [0.029]  [0.024] 
FV  0.000     0.001  0.010***     0.002  0.005 
   [0.002]     [0.002]  [0.004]     [0.002]  [0.006] 
FQ     0.023**  0.020**  0.048***  0.060*  0.047*  0.058 
      [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.018]  [0.032]  [0.028]  [0.036] 
FV x FQ           0.018**        0.009 
            [0.007]        [0.016] 
Labor force  -0.148***  -0.125***  -0.128***  -0.134***  -0.115*** 
-
0.124***  -0.125*** 
growth  [0.023]  [0.022]  [0.021]  [0.020]  [0.024]  [0.022]  [0.021] 
Observations  1209  1123  1123  1123  1123  1123  1123 
Regions  147  134  134  134  134  134  134 
Sargan χ
2  125.82  122.45***  130.74*  131.32  121.38***  127.55*  131.84 
Notes: GDP: Gross domestic product per region. FV: Financial volume measured as regional aggregate credit relative to 
GDP; FQ: Financial quality measured as regional mean bank efficiency. First-stage efficiency measures conditional on 
environmental controls (see Table 2.2). All variables measured in log levels. Standard errors in brackets. 
*/**/*** 
significant at 10%/5%/1%. In the system GMM estimation financial quality is specified as predetermined; financial 
volume and the interaction terms are specified as endogenous variables. Time trend included but not reported. Lagged 
levels and differences are used as instruments. 
 
 
The individual profit-efficiency effect of financial quality on regional growth is in 
turn positive and significant. It is also possible that both bank efficiency and credit 
effects off-set each other. In line with casual evidence from the recent credit  
16 
crises, Marquez (2002) shows that increasing competition can induce banks to 
lend excessively to low-quality borrowers, thereby causing inefficiencies. 
Therefore, we specify in column three the quantity and the profit-efficiency 
channel of financial intermediation simultaneously. Though the insignificance of a 
mere deepening of credit markets remains in line with Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2009), our measure of financial institutions’ quality, is statistically significant 
and positive. The absence of a volume effect might be due to our focus on mature 
economies in recent years. Another explanation could be that the provision of 
more credit by inefficient banks implies a poor selection of projects. High 
efficiency alone, in turn, may indicate that banks excessively scrutinize their 
supply of loans and avoid, for example, lending to more opaque small businesses 
that might bear future loan write-offs given difficult and costly assessments. 
  Therefore, we test if the interaction between bank quality and the volume of 
funds intermediated is significant. This model suggests that future finance-growth 
studies should account for three channels through which better banking can spur 
growth: a quantity, a quality, and an interaction effect of regional credit and bank 
efficiency. Each of these channels contributes significantly to output-per-capita 
growth in Europe’s mature regions, even in recent years. 
  Estimated magnitudes especially emphasize that better banking fosters 
regional economic growth. A 1% increase in banks' ability to convert inputs into 
financial services spurs regional growth in total by almost 0.06%. Because 
regional mean PE is low (63%), this implies that an improvement in PE by 
approximately one standard deviation (8%) translates into 48 basis points of 
additional economic growth. In light of mean growth rates (Table 2.1), such gains 
are economically meaningful. This result corroborates policies that foster banks’ 
profit efficiency in Europe. Also note that a 1% increase in the profit efficiency of 
banks has more than four times the effect on growth that a relative increase in 
lending volumes does. 
  In the right-hand panel of Table 3.1 we depict the results from specifications 
where we measure the quality channel via banks’ relative ability to minimize cost. 
Cost efficiency is interesting to investigate because most bank-efficiency studies 
use this model to evaluate bank performance. 
  Our results show only a modest and at best weakly significant relation 
between cost efficiency and regional growth. This may indicate that financial 
intermediaries that are relative top performers in terms of operating cost in the 
industry need not necessarily be those banks that also manage to conduct the most 
profitable business. This may simply reflect the idea that although cost 
minimization is a necessary condition for the realization of optimal profits, it is 
not a sufficient one. Banks’ ability to generate profits from their relations seems to 
especially stimulate regional economic growth.  
17 
  In sum, the quality effect of better financial institutions is both economically 
and statistically significant when measured by using banks profit efficiency.
17 We 
therefore focus henceforth on specifications using this measure of banks’ relative 
ability to conduct their business. Because our study is subject to a number of 
possible caveats, we conduct next a series of robustness checks on this relation 




4.1  Ordinary least squares 
First, one may doubt whether using a panel of annual observations permits any 
inference on growth when in fact business-cycle developments drive our findings. 
We attempt to address this concern given the restrictions imposed by data 
availability and estimate the long-term relation between financial quantity and 
quality proxies using simple OLS with average data covering the entire nine-year 
period (1996–2004). 
  We show in Table 4.1 individual and joint specifications of PE as well as 
initial GDP per worker in 1996 on the growth rate of GDP per worker. This 
specification is also known as a convergence regression and is analogous to the 
dynamic panel model presented before.
18 Larger, initial GDP per worker implies 
lower subsequent growth rates and therefore a negative coefficient is expected in 
this OLS specification. Our key interest here is to show that in both specifications 
the effect of profit efficiency on regional GDP per capita and on growth rates is 
significant and positive. 
 
                                                 
17 Coefficients of worker growth, the lagged endogenous variables, as well as the usual 
specification tests are in line with expectations, too. 
18 The analogy to the dynamic panel estimation follows from simply rewriting (lnyit – lnyit–1) = 
f(•)t + εit with t = 2004 and t–1 = 1996 used in the present OLS specification as lnyit = lnyit–1 + f(•)t 
+ εit, with annual observations such that t = 1994,…,2004 in a panel context (Islam, 1995). As 
such, a positive coefficient below 1 in the dynamic panel model is analogous to the familiar 
negative coefficient for initial income in the OLS convergence regression shown in Table 4.1 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
18 
Table 4.1  OLS estimates of profit efficiency on 
     GDP-per-worker  growth 
 
   GDP per worker growth 
   Quantity Quality Both Interaction 
Constant  1.564** 2.260*** 2.486*** 2.599*** 
   [0.603] [0.516] [0.503] [0.518] 
GDP1996  -0.171*** -0.216*** -0.237*** -0.239*** 
   [0.050] [0.046] [0.043] [0.043] 
FV  0.002   0.007 0.03 
   [0.004]   [0.005] [0.026] 
FQ    0.089** 0.082** 0.140* 
     [0.036] [0.037] [0.082] 
FV x FQ        0.028 
         [0.031] 
Labor force growth  -0.378** -0.267** -0.274** -0.243** 
   [0.162] [0.117] [0.117] [0.116] 
Observations  109 102 102 102 
R-squared  0.24 0.38 0.39 0.40 
Notes: Dependent variable is annualized GDP per worker growth rate per region 
between 1996 and 2004. FV: Financial volume measured as regional aggregate credit 
relative to GDP; FQ: Financial quality measured as regional mean profit efficiency. 
First-stage efficiency measures conditional on environmental controls (see Table 2.2). 
All variables measured in log levels. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
*/**/*** 
significant at 10%/5%/1%.  
 
 
Both parameters for initial income and working population growth are line with 
theory and previous evidence. More important, individual and joint specifications 
of FV and FQ are in line with dynamic panel estimations and have statistically 
and economically positive growth effects. This suggests that our findings do not 
seem to be solely driven by business-cycle developments. Because simple OLS 
methods neglect the possibly endogenous nature of either measure of financial 
development and do not exploit the panel nature of our data, we use henceforth 
the dynamic panel specification to address further potential concerns. 
 
 
4.2 Regional  allocation and financial centers 
Allocating banks to regions on the basis of headquarters location is inevitably 
heuristic to some degree. In a first set of robustness checks we therefore choose 
different samples to test the quality channel of financial development. Although 
the vast majority of banks in Europe continue to be small in size and regional in 
scope, some regions in Europe are financial centers of international relevance. We 
exclude these, but results reported in the first column of Table 4.2 remain  
19 
unaffected.
19 Next, we exclude the largest three banks in each region when 
aggregating FQ and FV. Results in column two demonstrate the insensitivity of 
our main finding to this choice. Finally, most banks in Europe are located in 
Germany, most of which are very small, operate locally, and might therefore drive 
the findings in our European sample. The third column in Table 4.2 shows results 
excluding Germany with no qualitative changes either. 
  A second set of regressions concerns possible aggregation problems with 
spatially lagged regressions. Ideally, we would like to weigh banks’ financial-
development proxies depending on the spatial distribution of their customers, for 
instance the location of borrowers. Alternatively, one could use the regional 
branch distribution as a weighting scheme. Neither approach is feasible because 
such information is private and unfortunately unavailable to us at the European 
level. 
 
Table 4.2  Financial centers and regional allocation 
 
   Excluding  Excluding  Excluding  Spatial spillovers 
   fin. centers  3 largest FI  Germany  FQ  FV  FV x FQ  Both  All 
Constant  1.159***  0.910***  1.201** 0.730*** 1.134*** 0.770*** 0.813***  0.822*** 
   [0.307]  [0.295]  [0.520] [0.269] [0.338] [0.258] [0.272]  [0.273] 
GDPt-1  0.877***  0.896***  0.875*** 0.910*** 0.881*** 0.907*** 0.903***  0.901*** 
   [0.029]  [0.028]  [0.050] [0.026] [0.031] [0.025] [0.026]  [0.026] 
FV  0.007*  0.010*  0.020*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.013***  0.015*** 
   [0.004]  [0.006]  [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]  [0.006] 
FQ  0.033***  0.033**  0.047*** 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.077***  0.084*** 
   [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.013] [0.017]  [0.019] 
FQ x FV  0.010*  0.010*  0.021*** 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.024***  0.027*** 
   [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]  [0.009] 
Spatial           -0.003     -0.002  -0.004 
FQ           [0.002]     [0.002]  [0.004] 
Spatial             -0.024**   -0.018*  -0.028** 
FV             [0.010]   [0.011]  [0.012] 
Spatial               0.003    -0.003 
FQ x FV              [0.002]    [0.004] 
Labor force 
growth 
-0.132***  -0.157***  -0.141*** -0.151*** -0.131*** -0.148*** -0.146***  -0.146*** 
[0.020]  [0.022]  [0.025] [0.019] [0.021] [0.019] [0.020]  [0.020] 
Observations  1078  1170  763 902 1123 902 902  902 
Regions  129  144  96 122 134 122 122  122 
Sargan  126.46  138  95.21 118.63* 130.77* 117.72* 118.12*  118.16* 
Notes: First-stage efficiency measures conditional on environmental controls described in Table 2.2. Standard errors in brackets. 
*/**/*** 
significant at 10%/5%/1%. In the system GMM estimation financial quality is specified as predetermined, financial volume and the 




We therefore rely on statistical techniques suggested by Anselin (1988) to allow 
banks’ profit efficiency and lending behaviors to affect growth outside the regions 
                                                 
19 These regions are Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Luxembourg, Madrid, Milan, and Paris.  
20 
in which they are headquartered. Specifically, we generate spatial lags of all three 
measures of financial development: quantity, quality, and their interaction. This 
permits financial development in neighboring regions to affect growth in region r 
to capture the notion that financial economic activity might not be spatially 
independent. A priori, the relation between spatially weighted financial 
development and regional growth remains unclear. For instance, borrowers may 
prefer to take out credit and consume in neighboring regions if banks process their 
savings there more efficiently. This would lead to a pull effect, which can have a 
negative spatial effect on economic growth. The effects of spatial lags of financial 
development proxies therefore remain an empirical question. Consider to this end 
the results in the five rightmost columns of Table 4.2. 
  Most important, we find that all five specifications of spatially weighted 
quantity and quality measures leave the positive direct effects on regional growth 
intact. In particular the individual and direct effect of financial quality as 
approximated by regional mean-profit efficiency increases considerably and is 
economically significant. Spatial lags of profit efficiency in neighboring regions 
are in turn always insignificant. Only the aggregate lending volume in adjunct 
regions exhibits a statistically significant negative coefficient. This suggests that 
deeper credit markets in the geographic vicinity exert a pull effect, perhaps by 
attracting some of the local investors. However, these centrifugal forces of 
economic activity are clearly compensated by economically (and statistically) 
significant direct effects through all identified channels of financial development 




4.3 Alternative  and  additional growth determinants 
The vast majority of finance-growth studies use data for financial development 
provided by the World Bank.
20 Therefore, we specify national financial market 
depth as a proxy for the volume of financial development FV in the first four 
columns of Table 4.3. This is in line with previous finance-growth studies (Levine 
et al, 2000) instead of the regional aggregates of bank credit used here. Both direct 
stock- and bond-market capitalization relative to national GDP are positive and 
statistically significant, but interaction effects are insignificant. The inclusion of 
traditional quantity measures that neglect the important spatial dispersion of credit 
within countries reduces but does not eliminate the quality effect, which we 
suggest to be of relevance here. 
 
                                                 
20 Financial development and structure data are available at http://www.worldbank.org.  
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Table 4.3  Alternative and additional growth controls 
 
   Stock market  Public bond market 
Bank market 
structure  Environmental controls 
   Individual  Interaction  Individual Interaction CR 3 CR 5 Patents Political  Banking
Constant  2.015***  1.618***  1.877*** 3.208*** 1.331*** 1.295*** 0.348 -0.277  -0.53
   [0.495]  [0.499]  [0.617] [0.557] [0.357] [0.353] [0.350] [0.391]  [0.335]
GDPt-1  0.807***  0.838***  0.806*** 0.683*** 0.858*** 0.861*** 0.940*** 0.960***  0.989***
   [0.047]  [0.047]  [0.058] [0.053] [0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [0.034]  [0.029]
FV  0.020***  0.034***  0.035*** 0.060*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.020***  0.010**
   [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.007] [0.015] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]  [0.005]
FQ  0.015**  0.043**  0.017** 0.025** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.056*** 0.062***  0.053***
   [0.007]  [0.021]  [0.007] [0.013] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.016]  [0.016]
FQ x FV     0.026    0.011 0.010** 0.010** 0.025*** 0.028***  0.020***
      [0.018]    [0.015] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008]  [0.008]
Labor force   -0.117***  -0.156***  -0.150*** -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.168*** -0.167***  -0.185***
Growth  [0.025]  [0.022]  [0.017] [0.020] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021]  [0.021]
Concentration             0.046*** 0.052*** 0.064*** 0.069***  0.078***
Ratio            [0.012] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014]  [0.019]
Patents                 0.000 0.000  -0.001
per capita                [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001]
Central bank                  0.089  -0.303***
independence                   [0.074]  [0.102]
Heritage index 
(HER) 
                0.102***  -0.003
                [0.030]  [0.033]
Income per  
branch (IB) 
                   -0.076***
                   [0.011]
Deposits per 
branch (DB) 
                   0.074***
                   [0.010]
Branches per 
capita (BC) 
                   0.004
                   [0.017]
Branch density                      -0.014***
(BD)                      [0.006]
Observations  1123  1123  1114 1114 1123 1123 973 973  973
Regions  134  134  133 133 134 134 133 133  133
Sargan  130.23**  120.67***  129.21** 123.57*** 129.25 129.21 125.31* 123.37*  125.32*
Notes: First-stage efficiency measures conditional on environmental controls described in Table 2.2. Standard errors in brackets. 
*/**/***
significant at 10%/5%/1%. In the system GMM estimation financial quality is specified as predetermined, financial volume and the 
interaction term are specified as endogenous variables. Time trend specified but not reported. Lagged levels and differences are used as 
instruments. Stock and public bond market capitalization are obtained from the World Bank and are measured relative to country GDP. 
Patents per capita at the NUTS 2 level are obtained from Eurostat. Other control variables are described in Table 2.2. 
 
 
Levine et al (2000) emphasize the importance to include additional control 
variables in finance-growth regressions to avoid selection of a favored result. 
Therefore, we conduct some additional robustness tests. A first concern relates to 
the ambiguous relation between growth and competition. According to previous 
empirical evidence, changes in bank competition can influence growth very 
differently.
21 Therefore, we include both the three- and five-firm concentration 
ratios, which are the aggregate market shares of the three (five) largest banks 
within a country, to control for a possible misspecification. Results in columns 
five and six show that concentration ratios are positively and significantly related 
to growth. This confirms Cetorelli’s (2004) argument that especially large firms, 
which contribute substantially to economic growth, benefit from concentrated 
                                                 
21 For example, negatively by deterring new firm creation (Cetorelli, 2004) or increased (and 
excessive) risk-taking of banks (Boyd and De Niccolo, 2005) versus statistically not at all 
(Valverde et al, 2003).  
22 
banking markets. The result is also in line with Allen and Gale (2004) in that 
fewer banks imply a more stable banking system, which is easier to supervise 
effectively.
22 Most important for our study is the result that market-structure 
proxies have an independent effect but leave coefficients for FQ and FV intact. 
  The three rightmost columns of Table 4.3 depict results after including one 
additional regional and more national environmental control variables. First, we 
specify patents per capita to control for differences in innovative capacity across 
regions but do not find a significant effect on regional growth. The identified 
effects of financial development on growth remain intact. Because we study the 
effect of financial development on regional growth, indicators of political and 
regulatory freedom as well as national banking-market traits, such as branch 
density and alike, may have direct effects on growth next to their influence on 
optimal costs, profits, and thus efficiency. Therefore, we use the same controls 
specified in the first-stage stochastic frontier analysis in the growth regression. 
The main finding is that both individual and interacted effects of regional 
financial quantity and financial quality proxies remain statistically and 
economically significant. Therefore, the positive effect of all three channels of 




Traditional measures of financial development hinge on quantity proxies, which 
might not fully reflect the ability of financial systems to intermediate funds. We 
suggest an additional quality measure of financial intermediaries to explain 
regional economic growth in Europe. We measure European banks’ profit 
efficiency and allocate both financial quality and quantity indicators to around 
147 NUTS 2 regions in 11 EU countries. We show that regional economic growth 
in mature economies and recent time periods benefits significantly from more 
efficient banks. 
  Our results highlight the importance of specifying three distinct channels 
through which banks may foster productivity growth: more credit, more efficient 
intermediaries, and the interaction of the two. The efficiency effect is 
approximately three times as large as the quantity channel. Apparently, it is 
especially the quality of financial services that spurs economic prosperity in 
Europe’s relatively mature economic regions. 
  Our results are robust to different empirical specifications as well as 
alternative, more frequently used measures of financial development. Future 
                                                 
22 Ideally, we would also test the regional market power of banks, for example by assessing the 
relation between lending margins or fees per branch on regional growth. Unfortunately this 
information is not available to us and we therefore use simple indicators at the national level.  
23 
research should aim to incorporate the quality effects of financial markets, 
competition among financial institutions, and regional interdependencies more 
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